The concept of likelihood ratios was introduced more than 40 years ago, yet this powerful metric has still not seen wider application or discussion in the medical decision-making process. There is concern that clinicians-intraining are still being taught an oversimplified approach to diagnostic test performance and have limited exposure to likelihood ratios. Even for those familiar with likelihood ratios, they might perceive them as mathematically cumbersome in application, if not difficult to determine for a particular disease process. This article takes a conceptual approach to likelihood ratios and applies them to two clinical settings: 1) severe intracranial injury after minor head trauma and 2) suspected pulmonary embolism with shortness of breath. Likelihood ratios are the most appropriate metric for efficient rational clinical examination and can prevent unnecessary and wasteful treatments and procedures.
RETHINKING THE UTILITY OF SPin AND SNout

B
iostatistics occupies a relatively meager part of typical medical school curricula in spite of the increasing reliance on evidence-based statistical tools to guide diagnostic examination. Traditional lectures have been replaced by small group activities and enhanced clinical experiences, and the biostatistical content may be taught using technical terms and concepts that lack practical relevance for future physicians. The foundation of diagnostic testing is often introduced with 2 9 2 tables that are difficult to associate conceptually with the formulas of sensitivity and specificity. Even more regrettably, the commonly taught two mnemonics that have the best chance for retention-SPin and SNout, for ruling in and ruling out diseases, respectively-are technically incorrect. The teaching is that a highly sensitive (S) test wherein a patient tests negative (N) effectively rules out a disease (SNout = rule out). This mnemonic assumes a low rate of expected falsenegatives (FN):
FN rate % ð1 À sensÞ where (sens) is the sensitivity (Figure 1 ). For example, assuming that a D-dimer test has a sensitivity of 0.95, and that a patient's D-dimer test came back negative, then it would be declared that a falsely negative result is very unlikely (i.e., only 1 -0.95 = 0.05, or 5 of 100 patients with pulmonary embolism [PE] would not captured by the test), but is PE ruled out?
The first pitfall to SNout is relying solely on the sensitivity when the number of false-negatives (FN) depends on the pretest probability p, given by FN ¼ ðpÞ Â ð1 À sensÞ A patient with a high pretest probability goes straight to CT angiography, obviating the need for D-dimer testing because the FN would be high. The second pitfall is that a highly sensitive test is not, in itself, representative of predictive value. High sensitivity only informs the clinician how reliable a test is in picking out patients with disease when compared to a criterion standard. But when a patient wants to know what a negative D-dimer test means, the patient is actually asking about the negative predictive value (NPV) of the test, which depends not only on the pretest probability (p) but the specificity (spec) as well.
This leads to the third pitfall of SNout: sensitivity and specificity are intertwined in the interpretation of diagnostic tests and should not be interpreted independently. Consider again a highly sensitive but poorly specific test. By relying solely on sensitivity, a clinician might rule out a patient with a negative test because the false-negative rate is low. But if the test is simultaneously poorly specific, then the true-negative rate is also low, and it could potentially be a toss-up whether a test that comes back negative is truly negative (Figure 2) If we calculate the NPV for a highly sensitive (sens) = 0.95 and poorly specific (spec) = 0.05 test, we see that the NPV is unchanged from what would have been the original pretest probability without disease (1 -p).
While this is the most extreme example of a highly sensitive test providing no additional value, it illustrates how considering sensitivity or specificity in isolation (i.e., SNout and, by analogy, SPin) oversimplifies the performance of a diagnostic test and has the potential to mislead a clinician's decision-making process. 1 Both sensitivity and specificity of a test must be considered in conjunction when evaluating a diagnostic test. The mnemonics SPin and SNout were first mentioned in a 1992 article, but the author concludes that likelihood ratios are a "more powerful, faster approach."
2 It has been long overdue to heed the original advice.
LIKELIHOOD RATIOS: A BETTER ALTERNATIVE
Likelihood ratios are applied in the diagnostic examination process after first determining that a patient's pretest odds sick well À Á meets the testing threshold and, secondly, that the result would lead to a change in clinical management (Figure 3) . 3 For many diseases, we use pure clinical reasoning and clinical prediction tools (e.g., "Wells score" for PE) to create a pretest probability and then use tests to adjust this probability. A test that yields a positive result and shapes a pretest odds toward ruling in a disease is represented by the equation (Figure 4) . A good "rule-in" diagnostic test maximizes the truepositive rate (the numerator) and minimizes false-positive rate (well, +) (the denominator). Substituting (LR+ = sick;þ well;þ ) with the definitions of sensitivity and specificity into the previous equation yields Figure 2 . A highly sensitive test is good at picking out those who are truly sick with few false-negatives (sick, test-), but if the test is not specific, then few who are well end up testing negative (well, test-). Therefore, after a high-sensitivity-low-specificity test, there could be no change in the proportion of sick versus well, resulting in little assistance in the clinical decision-making process. for ruling in a disease. Close attention still has to be paid with respect to whether or not the original studies generated biased (e.g., from spectrum or selection bias) values of sensitivity and specificity; otherwise, the subsequent likelihood ratios may also be biased. Likelihood ratios derived from rigorous, well-designed studies are portable, can be compared directly, and can be applied to a specific patient. 5 Negative likelihood ratios are especially pertinent and applicable to emergency physicians. Many clinical decision tools (e.g., Ottawa ankle, NEXUS, Pulmonary Embolism Rule-out Criteria [PERC]) were designed to identify low-risk "well" patients who do not require advanced imaging or further testing. These tools are effectively composite tests that have excellent negative likelihood ratios,
that maximally discriminate patients who are well and appropriately test negative from those who are actually sick and incorrectly test negative ( Figure 5 ).
When a test comes back negative for a patient, his or her pretest odds is shaped by the multiplicative factor (LR-), and the resulting posttest odds is decreased, nudging toward a lesser odds of having a disease or at least to an "acceptably" low risk (e.g., < 2%). This can continue for a series of tests using each successive posttest odds generated as the new pretest odds leading to series of compounded nudges (e.g., two LRs):
Clinicians are more familiar thinking in terms of probabilities, but probability is not equivalent to odds, probability sick sick þ well 6 ¼ odds sick well and likelihood ratios cannot be multiplied with probability. But if we assign the probability of disease (i.e. sick) as "p" and well
, then it is possible to interconvert between odds and probabilities as illustrated in Figure 6 .
This representation has the disadvantage of mathematical abstraction and is less intuitive, but thankfully we have several tools that obviate the need for cumbersome calculations in the clinical realm. The Fagan nomogram is a graphical approach that estimates the posttest probability via a line through the pretest probability and likelihood ratio. 6 It is very accessible, but can be prone to error. There could be considerable variation in line construction if the pretest probability is even slightly shifted-not to mention having both the diagram and a straight-edge on hand to accomplish this task. Online calculators are an alternative method for determining precise posttest probabilities, but may not always be practical. One of the most useful applications of likelihood ratios at the bedside was introduced by McGee, 7 who noted that posttest probabilities increased by approximately regular increments at specific likelihood ratios ( Figure 7) .
In addition to the aforementioned obstacles to calculating posttest probabilities/odds, there are several structural factors relating to the underutilization of likelihood ratios. First, there is limited exposure to likelihood ratios beginning with medical school and continuing through clinical training. Second, likelihood ratios have been confused with odds ratios (which in turn have been conflated with relative risk, but this is a separate problem) in the literature. Third, journal articles continue to report predominantly sensitivity and specificity, which may contribute to their isolated use. We encourage physicians to take the extra steps to calculate
BENEFITS OF USING LIKELIHOOD RATIOS IN CLINICAL SETTINGS
Emergency physicians perform focused histories and physical examinations and order diagnostic tests that most efficiently rule out deadly diagnoses. Likelihood ratios clarify what a "focused" H&P entails by indicating to emergency physicians which elements are of the highest yield. Clinical decision tools often aid this approach by combining the best likelihood ratios from history, examination, and laboratory tests. Given that a (LR+) = 2 increases a posttest probability from 50% to roughly 65% (Figure 7 ), (LR+) = 2 is defined here as the lower limit of a clinically meaningful (LR+). On the other end, a negative likelihood ratio = 0.5 is the upper limit of a clinically meaningful (LR-) because it translates to shifting a pretest probability of 50% downward to 35%. The higher bars of (LR+) = 10 and (LR-) = 0.1 are generally accepted as the levels for "ruling in" or "ruling out" a diagnosis, respectively. 4 Large studies publish characteristics of diagnostic tests with likelihood ratios and 95% confidence intervals (CIs), the latter of which reflecting the precision of the estimate. Any CI that encompasses a likelihood ratio equal to 1 implies that the following could occur, The majority of these patients are well-appearing, and the physician must determine if neuroimaging is necessary. Numerous studies have addressed this question, and a recent meta-analysis pooled data from 14 studies to examine what factors among patients with minor head trauma were associated with severe intracranial injury, defined as requiring prompt neurosurgical intervention. 11 Table 1 lists clinically meaningful likelihood ratios from several high-quality studies.
Population-based studies have determined these characteristics to be the highest yield in changing Figure 5 . Many clinical decision tools in the ED have good negative likelihood ratios (LR-) < 0.5 that can bring a patient's "low risk" of disease further downward. For example, a test with (LR-) = 0.10 will brings a low-risk pretest probability < 15% further lower to <1.8%. Figure 6 . Calculating a posttest probability from a pretest probability requires a mathematical detour through odds sick well À Á so that it can be multiplied by the likelihood ratio (in this case a negative likelihood ratio), which is similarly a ratio of sick;À well;À . Suppose a triage note describes an elderly patient on anticoagulation who was on a curb when a motor vehicle backed into her at low speed, causing her to fall and hit her head. Is a positive likelihood ratio useful in guiding management? Based on meta-analysis of more than 23,000 patients with minor head trauma, the baseline risk of severe intracranial injury is approximately 7%.
11 Using 7% as the pretest probability for the patient, it is possible to estimate the posttest probability by the 3 risk factors from the triage note: pedestrian struck, age > 65 years, coagulopathy yields a combined (LR+) = (3)(2.3)(2.2) = 15 ( Figure 8A) .
A posttest probability of 52% is not particularly useful as it is essentially a coin-toss probability of severe intracranial injury. A noncontrast head CT would have been ordered in this simple example anyway based on clinical gestalt; however, it serves as an illustration of how combining multiple tests can generate clinically significant likelihood ratios.
Consider the multiplication of (LR-) composed of absence of features-age ≥ 65 years, dangerous mechanism, vomiting, amnesia, Glasgow Coma Scale score < 15 at 2 hours, skull fracture: (LR-) = (0.77) (0.75)(0.89)(0.75)(0.5)(0.85) = 0.16, a negative likelihood ratio that would significantly move the posttest possibility of severe intracranial injury downward (Figure 8A) . Indeed, these characteristics comprise the Canadian CT Head Rule, and our calculated combined (LR-) is similar to that validated in several studies. The characteristics of two existing CT rules are seen in Table 2 . [12] [13] [14] 16 Of note, the New Orleans Criteria included slightly different characteristics: age > 60 years, intoxication, headache, any vomiting, seizure, amnesia, visible trauma above clavicle. But the Canadian CT Head Rule was more accurate than the New Orleans Criteria in all but one study. 11, 13, 16, 18 This is consistent with the likelihood ratios of each test element from Table 1 . Minor head trauma patients satisfying the Canadian CT Head Rule are deemed as "low risk" for severe intracranial injury. The negative likelihood ratio can quantify what this actually means, which could be useful for shared decision making with a patient. Once again assuming a 7% population risk and (LR-) = 0.04, o post = (LR-= 0.04)(0.075) = 0.003 the and posttest probability of severe injury is equal to p post ¼ 0:003 1þ0:003 ¼ 0:30% ( Figure 8B ). That is, of 1,000 patients, only three patients would be missed. This is an acceptably low risk for discharging a patient without a noncontrast head CT.
Clinical Scenario 2: Pulmonary Embolism
The use of negative likelihood ratios in evaluation of deadly diseases is analogous to the use of the surgeon's scalpel in the management of bulky tumors. Each question or physical examination maneuver by an emergency physician is like a surgeon's scalpel slice With (LR-) < 0.1, these decision rules are most appropriately used in the negative (LR-) direction. LR = likelihood ratio.
away of risk. Risks of mimicking diseases presenting with similar signs and symptoms are sliced away until only one deadly disease remains. And even when clinical prediction tools find the risk to be low, sometimes another cut is warranted to ensure a tumor-free margin. However, as the following pulmonary embolism (PE) scenario illustrates, likelihood ratios must be applied in the correct setting. The first step is to determine the pretest probability of PE by either clinical gestalt or scoring method (e.g., Wells or revised Geneva score). A low pretest probability (<15%) combined with the PERC (age < 50 years, pulse < 100 beats/min, SaO 2 ≥ 95%, no hemoptysis, no estrogen use, no surgery/trauma requiring hospitalization within 4 weeks, no prior venous thromboembolism, and no unilateral leg swelling) can bring the posttest probability to <2%, an acceptably low risk that rules out PE (Figure 9 ). PERC has a negative likelihood ratio of LR-= 0.17[0.11 -0.25] and results in "a false-negative rate below 1.0% if the initial prevalence of venous thromboembolism was less than 6% in the population under consideration," as stated in the original article and illustrated in Figure 10 . 19 Now suppose that a 70-year-old patient with shortness of breath and tachycardia is being evaluated for suspected PE with a Wells score of 4.5 (PE 1 on differential, heart rate > 100 beats/min). The PERC rule is not applicable in this situation and the Wells score places the patient at intermediate risk (pretest probability approximately 16%). A D-dimer test (with LR-= 0.1) that returns negative means that the posttest probability is approximately 1%, sufficiently low to exclude PE. On the other hand, a positive result (with LR+ = 2) results in a posttest probability of 28%, which is too high to safely discharge the patient without treatment and too low for empiric treatment. Therefore, further workup is required. In this scenario, if a CT pulmonary angiogram returns negative (with LR-= 0.06), then the posttest probability is 1%, and the risk is acceptably low to rule out PE. Conversely, if the CT returns positive (with LR+ = 14), the posttest probability is 73%, certainly high enough to warrant prompt treatment.
Intermediate risk patients (pretest probability closer to 40%) of PE pose a greater diagnostic challenge. Suppose that there are 100 patients deemed Figure 8 . Assuming a pretest probability of 7%, (A) a combined positive likelihood ratio (LR+) = 15 yields a posttest probability of 52% whereas (B) a combined negative likelihood ratio (LRÀ) = 0.16, representing all features of the Candian CT Head Rule, yields a posttest probability of 0.3% Figure 9 . The combined negative likelihood ratio of the PERC rule, (LRÀ) = 0.17, will shift a pretest probability of 6% down to 1.1%. Figure 10 . The diagnostic testing pathway for a patient at low risk (pretest probability < 15%) has an order in which negative likelihood ratios are applied. Importantly, it is not appropriate to apply the PERC rule to any patient that is of intermediate risk or higher. Figure 11 . In a hypothetical situation where the pretest probability is 40% (intermediate risk of PE), a negative D-dimer test may not be sufficient to rule out PE.
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to be at intermediate risk with pretest probability (p = 40%). As shown in Figure 11 , a negative D-dimer with (LR-) = 0.1 yields a posttest probability that is 6.25%, which may not be acceptably low enough to rule out PE. Moreover, of the 60 patients who do not actually have PE (i.e., well), a specificity = 0.5 means that 30 of these patients will, on average, have falsely positive D-dimer, necessitating more testing. Despite the calculation of precise posttest probabilities, the interpretation and utilization of the numbers relies heavily on the original clinical gestalt.
Studies have shown that D-dimer specificity is a function of age, and this had led to age-adjusted thresholds for the D-dimer test. 22, 23 Using these thresholds increased specificity by nearly 50% while maintaining high sensitivity, and one study found that the percentage of patients in whom PE could be excluded increased from 6.4% (43 or 673) to 30% (200 of 673). 22, 23 Returning to the equation for the negative likelihood ratio, LRÀ ¼ 1 À sens spec and noting that increasing spec from 0.5 to 0.75 in the denominator results in (LR-)~0.07, we can readily see how likelihood ratios help us understand how this was possible.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to reintroduce the concepts and biostatistics behind likelihood ratios. It was motivated by the concern that clinicians-in-training have oversimplified the interpretation of diagnostic tests (i.e., SPin and SNout). Sensitivity and specificity should be considered in conjunction, as they naturally are in likelihood ratios. Negative likelihood ratios are particularly relevant to emergency physicians as they offer insight to how clinical decision tools prevent overtesting and how deadly diseases are ruled out. The reasons why and how likelihood ratios are used are more important than the mathematical calculationsin fact, they are the foundation upon which evidencebased clinical diagnostic reasoning is built. It is the broader hope that likelihood ratios will be introduced earlier in the medical school and residency training and more appreciated in emergency medicine practice.
